Filosofia Unisinos 18 (1) (2017)

Authors
Giovanni Rolla
Universidade Federal da Bahia
Abstract
Assuming a radical stance on embodied cognition, according to which the information ac- quired through basic cognitive processes is not contentful (Hutto and Myin, 2013), and as- suming that perception is a source of rationally grounded knowledge (Pritchard, 2012), a pluralistic account of perceptual knowledge is developed. The paper explains: (i) how the varieties of perceptual knowledge fall under the same broader category; (ii) how they are subject to the same kind of normative constraints; (iii) why there could not be a conflict between the different varieties of perceptual knowledge; and (iv) why the traditional episte- mological inquiry is inclined to overestimate the role of propositional perceptual knowledge.
Keywords Radical enactivism  Perceptual knowledge  Knowledge-how  Knowledge-that
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DOI 10.4013/fsu.2017.181.06
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References found in this work BETA

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Tolerant Enactivist Cognitive Science.Thomas Raleigh - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):226-244.
Radical Enactivism and Self-Knowledge.Giovanni Rolla - 2018 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (141):723-743.

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