Filosofia Unisinos 22 (1):21-28 (2021)

Giovanni Rolla
Universidade Federal da Bahia
This paper intends to offer a critical evaluation of the role played by intuitions in the mainstream methodology in traditional analytic epistemology. The criticism directed to what I call methodology of evaluation by intuitions shows that epistemologists often idealize the reliability of intuitions when assessing a theory against potential counterexamples, ignoring that the disposition to answer intuitively to a case of concept attribution is bounded to the familiar dimension in which the relevant conceptual competence emerges. Thus, the reliability of intuitions does not necessarily extend to far-fetched cases. Given that the assessment by our intuitions is not sufficient to decide for or against an epistemological theory, I offer a sketch for a pragmatic and naturalized conception of theoretical decision-making in epistemology.Key-words: Intuitions, Analytic epistemology, Conceptual abilities, Naturalism, Pragmatism.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.4013/fsu.2021.221.03
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,214
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Seemingly Semantic Intuitions.Kent Bach - 2002 - In Joseph K. Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics. Seven Bridges Press. pp. 21--33.
Intuitions and Semantic Theory.Henry Jackman - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (3):363-380.
Thin, Fine and with Sensitivity: A Metamethodology of Intuitions.James Andow - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-21.
Do Philosophical Intuitions Need Calibration?Marko Jurjako - 2015/2016 - Anthropology and Philosophy 12:73-84.
Which Are The Data That Competence Provides For Linguistic Intuitions?Dunja Jutronić - 2014 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 10 (2):119-143.
The Argument From Variation Against Using One’s Own Intuitions As Evidence.Esther Goh - 2019 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 56 (2):95-110.
What Good Are Counterexamples?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.
Intuitions and Conceptual Analysis in Wittgensteinian Pragmatism.David Hommen & Frauke Albersmeier - 2019 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 22 (1):72-91.


Added to PP index

Total views
10 ( #899,956 of 2,507,561 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,983 of 2,507,561 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes