Group Justification in Science

Episteme 7 (3):215-231 (2010)
Abstract
An analysis of group justification enables us to understand what it means to say that a research group is justified in making a claim on the basis of evidence. I defend Frederick Schmitt's (1994) joint account of group justification by arguing against a simple summative account of group justification. Also, I respond to two objections to the joint account, one claiming that social epistemologists should always prefer the epistemic value of making true judgments to the epistemic value of maintaining consistency, and another one claiming that the notion of joint commitment implicit in the joint account is epistemically unacceptable.
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DOI 10.3366/epi.2010.0204
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References found in this work BETA

Social Empiricism.Miriam Solomon - 1994 - Noûs 28 (3):325-343.
Who has Scientific Knowledge?K. Brad Wray - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):337 – 347.

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Citations of this work BETA

Values in Science: The Case of Scientific Collaboration.Kristina Rolin - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (2):157-177.

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