Logos and Episteme 10 (2):195-205 (2019)

Giovanni Rolla
Universidade Federal da Bahia
In this paper, I argue that knowledge is dimly luminous. That is: if a person knows that p, she knows how she knows that p. The argument depends on a safety-based account of propositional knowledge, which is salient in Williamson’s critique of the ‘KK’ principle. I combine that account with non-intellectualism about knowledge-how – according to which, if a person knows how to φ, then in nearly all nearby possible worlds in which she φes in the same way as in the actual world, she only φes successfully. Thus, the possession of first-order propositional knowledge implies secondorder practical knowledge, and this can be iterated. Because of the assumed nonintellectualism about know-how, dim luminosity does not imply bright luminosity about knowledge, which is expressed by the traditional KK principle. I conclude by considering some potential counterexamples to the view that knowledge is dimly luminous.
Keywords Luminosity  Knowlege-how  Knowledge-that  Safety
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme201910217
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What Is It to Know Someone?David Lauer - 2014 - Philosophical Topics 42 (1):321-344.
Knowing the Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.
Know How to Be Gettiered?Ted Poston - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):743 - 747.
Dispositional Knowledge-How Versus Propositional Knowledge-That.Gregor Damschen - 2009 - In Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf & Karsten Stueber (eds.), Debating Dispositions. Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter. pp. 278-295.
Knowing-That, Knowing-How, or Knowing-To?Yong Huang - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:65-94.
KK and the Knowledge Norm of Action.Michael Da Silva - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (3):321-331.
The Epistemology of Non-Instrumental Value.Joel J. Kupperman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):659-680.
Inverted First-Person Authority.Colin McGinn - 2004 - The Monist 87 (2):237-254.
The Epistemology of Non-Instrumental Value.Joel J. Kupperman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):659–680.
Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):417 - 430.
Wiggins on Practical Knowledge.Henry Clarke - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (42):113-124.
Modeling Practical Thinking.Matthew Mosdell - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (4):445-464.


Added to PP index

Total views
54 ( #184,843 of 2,411,496 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #52,306 of 2,411,496 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes