Kitcher, mathematics, and naturalism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):481 – 497 (2008)
This paper argues that Philip Kitcher's epistemology of mathematics, codified in his Naturalistic Constructivism, is not naturalistic on Kitcher's own conception of naturalism. Kitcher's conception of naturalism is committed to (i) explaining the correctness of belief-regulating norms and (ii) a realist notion of truth. Naturalistic Constructivism is unable to simultaneously meet both of these commitments.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802001947
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