Weltstoff und absolute Beharrlichkeit: Die Erste Analogie der Erfahrung und der Entwurf Übergang 1–14 des Opus postumum

Kant-Studien 102 (2):168-190 (2011)
In Kant's theoretical philosophy substance is not only constitutive for objects as one of the categories of pure reason, but also functions as a substrate for the unity of time. Result of these different functions is an ambiguity in the meaning of Kant's notion of substance. Is there only one or are there many individual substances?This paper traces the ways in which Kant uses substance not only in the Critique of Pure Reason, but also in the draft „Transition 1–14“ of the Opus postumum to find a solution for this problem
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DOI 10.1515/kant.2011.013
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