Conditioning and Interpretation Shifts

Studia Logica 100 (3):583-606 (2012)

Jan-Willem Romeijn
University of Groningen
This paper develops a probabilistic model of belief change under interpretation shifts, in the context of a problem case from dynamic epistemic logic. Van Benthem [4] has shown that a particular kind of belief change, typical for dynamic epistemic logic, cannot be modelled by standard Bayesian conditioning. I argue that the problems described by van Benthem come about because the belief change alters the semantics in which the change is supposed to be modelled: the new information induces a shift in the interpretation of the sentences. In this paper I show that interpretation shifts can be modeled in terms of updating by conditioning. The model derives from the knowledge structures developed by Fagin et al [8], and hinges on a distinction between the propositional and informational content of sentences. Finally, I show that Dempster-Shafer theory provides the appropriate probability kinematics for the model
Keywords Probabilistic epistemology  Bayesian updating  Dynamic epistemic logic  Knowledge structures  Dempster-Shafer theory
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DOI 10.1007/s11225-012-9415-x
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References found in this work BETA

Betting on Theories.Patrick Maher - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.
A Mathematical Theory of Evidence.Glenn Shafer - 1976 - Princeton University Press.
Probability and the Art of Judgment.Richard Jeffrey - 1992 - Cambridge University Press.

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Placing Probabilities of Conditionals in Context.Ronnie Hermens - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):415-438.

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