Authors
Komarine Romdenh-Romluc
University of Sheffield
Abstract
We assume that we can act—in at least some cases—by consciously intending to do so. Wegner (2002) appeals to empirical research carried out by Libet et al. (1983) to challenge this assumption. I argue that his conclusion presupposes a particular view of conscious intention. But there is an alternative model available, which has been developed by various writers in the phenomenological tradition, and most recently defended by Moran (2001). If we adopt this alternative account of conscious intention, Wegner’s argument no longer goes through, and we can retain the claim that our conscious intentions can give rise to action
Keywords Action  Intention  Introspection - Libet  Wegner
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9201-7
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References found in this work BETA

The Illusion of Conscious Will.R. Holton - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):218-221.
Phenomenology of Perception.Mary Warnock - 1964 - Philosophical Quarterly 14 (57):372-375.

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