Ignorance and Virtue

Philosophical Papers 34 (2):261-272 (2005)
Abstract
Julia Driver has argued that there is a class of virtues that are compatible with or even require that an agent be ignorant in some respect. In this paper I argue for an alternative conception of the relationship between ignorance and virtue. The dispositions constitutive of virtue must include sensitivity to human limitations and fallibility. In this way the virtues accommodate ignorance, rather than require or promote it. I develop my account by considering two virtues in particular: tolerance (the paradigm for my account) and modesty (which Driver employs as the paradigm for her account). Although several philosophers have offered alternatives to Driver's account of modesty and others have discussed tolerance as a moral virtue, an adequate account of the role of ignorance in the specification of the virtues generally has yet to be provided. I believe that similarities between the two virtues are instructive for defining that role
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DOI 10.1080/05568640509485158
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References found in this work BETA
Virtue and Ignorance.Owen Flanagan - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (8):420-428.
Modesty as a Virtue.Michael Ridge - 2000 - American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (3):269 - 283.

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