Intention and Agency

Review of Metaphysics 40 (4):773-775 (1987)

Abstract
Causal theories of action have for some time stumbled over so-called wayward causal chains, Gettier-like counter-examples in which the behavior is causally traceable to e.g., a desire/belief complex but the path from this intentional cause to behavior is so tortuous that intuition balks at calling the behavior action proper. Part of the difficulty is that such theories of action presuppose a Humean account of causality, with all its implied passivity.
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0034-6632
DOI revmetaph198740450
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