American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (2):175-183 (1983)

Authors
Amelie Rorty
PhD: Yale University; Last affiliation: Boston University
Abstract
A person has performed an action akratically when he intentionally, voluntarily acts contrary to what he thinks, all things considered, is best to do. This is very misleadingly called weakness of the will; less misleadingly, akrasia of action. I should like to show that there is intellectual as well as practical akrasia. This might, equally misleadingly, be called weakness of belief; less misleadingly, akrasia of belief.
Keywords epistemic akrasia
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Self-Deception.Ian Deweese-Boyd - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Obsessive–Compulsive Akrasia.Samuel Kampa - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (4):475-492.
The Spontaneity of Emotion.Jean Moritz Müller - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):1060-1078.
Akratic Believing?Jonathan E. Adler - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (1):1 - 27.
Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief.Eugene Chislenko - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):669-690.

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