Not all that strange: A response to Dreyfus and Spinosa


Abstract
Dreyfus and Spinosa's 'Coping with Things-in-themselves' assumes that the line between the familiar and the strange coincides with the line between the 'for us' and the 'in itself'. But their opponents would urge that the familiar-strange distinction be dealt with pragmatically rather than ontologically.
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DOI 10.1080/002017499321679
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