The social and political sources of akrasia

Ethics 107 (4):644-657 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Akrasia is not always --or only-- a solitary failure to act on a person's judgment of what is, all things considered, best. Nor is it always a species of moral or ethical failure prompted by a form of irrationality. It is often prompted by social support and sustained by structuring political institutions

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Emotions and the intelligibility of akratic action.Christine Tappolet - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 97--120.
Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will.Lubomira Radoilska - 2012 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 43:25-50.
Akratic Believers.Amelie Rorty - 1983 - American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (2):175-183.
Akrasia, collective and individual.Philip Pettit - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 68--97.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
148 (#130,856)

6 months
17 (#161,262)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Amelie Rorty
PhD: Yale University; Last affiliation: Boston University

Citations of this work

Veganism, Moral Motivation and False Consciousness.Susana Pickett - 2021 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 34 (3):1-21.
El problema de la akrasia en las Disertaciones de Epicteto.Rodrigo Sebastián Braicovich - 2008 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 41:109-130.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references