Vi. akrasia and conflict

Inquiry 23 (2):193 – 212 (1980)
Abstract
As Elster suggests in his chapter 'Contradictions of the Mind', in Logic and Society, akrasia and self-deception represent the most common psychological functions for a person in conflict and contradiction. This article develops the theme of akrasia and conflict. Section I says what akrasia is not. Section II describes the character of the akrates, analyzing the sorts of conflicts to which he is subject and describing the sources of his debilities. A brief account is then given of the attractions of the akratic alternative: its power to focus or dominate the agent's attention; its being strongly habitual; its having the pull of social streaming: following the charismatic leader, the mechanisms of sympathetic or antipathetic infection, the models of role casting. Following these strategies is by no means pathological: these are relatively automatic (though still voluntary) psychological functions. That is precisely their power and attraction: they provide the conflicted akrates with an action solution, though not one that accords with his preferred judgment.
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DOI 10.1080/00201748008601902
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References found in this work BETA
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?Donald Davidson - 1970 - In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts. Oxford University Press.
Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands.Michael Walzer - 1973 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (2):160-180.

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Citations of this work BETA
What is Self-Control?Edmund Henden - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):69 – 90.
Akratic Attitudes and Rationality.Robert Dunn - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):24 – 39.
Weakness of Will and Divisions of the Mind.Edmund Henden - 2004 - European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):199–213.
Perverse Preference: Self-Beguilement or Self-Division?David Pugmire - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):73 - 94.

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