Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):97-112 (2009)
ABSTRACT This paper provides an argument against doxastic voluntarism. After discussing the sort of cases adduced by Carl Ginet as clear examples of voluntary belief-acquisition, I propose an alternative explanation based on the notion of acceptance and offer a defence of the belief/acceptance distinction as a consequence of the con-cept of belief. My general contention is: when someone acknowledges some eviden-tial states or doxastic reasons as showing that p, she immediately believes that p. I argue for this immediacy in believing and draw an analogy between believing and un-derstanding. The last sections are devoted to showing the fundamental voluntariness of intention and acceptance, in contrast to belief, and to offering an explanation of ―recalcitrant beliefs‖ within the present framework.
|Keywords||doxastic voluntarism belief acceptance intention voluntariness|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence.Danny Frederick - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):24-44.
Doxastic Voluntarism, Epistemic Deontology and Belief-Contravening Commitments.Michael J. Shaffer - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):73-82.
Leaps of Knowledge.Andrew Reisner - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-183.
Voluntarism and Transparent Deliberation.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):171-176.
Descartes and the Question of Direct Doxastic Voluntarism.Rico Vitz - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:107-21.
Three Problematic Theories of Conditional Acceptance.Michael J. Shaffer - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (1):117-125.
Volitionism and Voluntarism About Belief.Pascal Engel - 1999 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):265-281.
The Will and Evidence Toward Belief: A Critical Essay on Jonathan E. Adler's Belief's Own Ethics.Nathan Segars - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):79 – 91.
Added to index2012-11-20
Total downloads22 ( #222,634 of 2,152,238 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #185,125 of 2,152,238 )
How can I increase my downloads?