Synthese 198 (8):7119-7147 (2021)

Mauro Rossi
Université du Québec à Montréal
The goal of this paper is to offer a new theory of moods, according to which moods are perceptual experiences that represent undetermined objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. I start by listing a series of features that moods are typically taken to possess and claim that a satisfactory theory of moods must be able either to explain why moods genuinely possess these features or to explain these appearances away in a non-ad hoc way. I show that my account provides a plausible explanation of all the main features of moods. I conclude by addressing some objections against my account.
Keywords Moods  Emotions  Perceptual experiences  Undetermined objects  Evaluative properties  Christine Tappolet
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-019-02513-1
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Citations of this work BETA

Moods: From Diffusivness to Dispositionality.Alex Grzankowski & Mark Textor - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
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Emotion.Charlie Kurth - 2022 - Routledge.

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