Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1

Abstract
This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On this view, what it is for an agent to believe a proposition is for her credence in this proposition to be above a certain threshold, a threshold that varies depending on pragmatic factors. We show that while this account of belief can provide an elegant explanation of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, it is not alone in doing so, for an alternative account of belief, which we call the reasoning disposition account, can do so as well. And the latter account, we argue, is far more plausible than pragmatic credal reductivism, since it accords far better with a number of claims about belief that are very hard to deny
Keywords Credence  Pragmatic Encroachment  Lockean
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00552.x
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Beliefs Do Not Come in Degrees.Andrew Moon - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 2:1-27.
Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.
Belief is Weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.
Uncertainty Without All the Doubt.Aaron Norby - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (1):70-94.

View all 26 citations / Add more citations

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