Brandom on modality, normativity, and intentionality

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):611-23 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

1. Professor Brandom’s paper is addressed to a methodological question: When we set out to account for the intentionality of thought and language, what resources may we exploit? Which notions may we use? Brandom is a famously ambitious theorist. Unlike his colleague, John McDowell, Brandom has long maintained that we should at least aspire to explain intentionality in non-intentional terms. This leaves it open, however, which non-intentional resources are legitimate.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
370 (#51,588)

6 months
11 (#196,102)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Gideon Rosen
Princeton University

Citations of this work

The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.
The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.
Should I Believe the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.

View all 43 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references