Consciousness and higher-order thought

In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan (2002)
Authors
David Rosenthal
CUNY Graduate Center
Abstract
The problem of consciousness is to say what it is for some of our thoughts, feelings, and sensations to be conscious, given that others are not. This is different from saying what it is for a person to be conscious or not conscious. Even when people are conscious, many of their thoughts and sensations typically are not. And there's nothing problematic about a person's being conscious; it's just the person's being awake and responsive to sensory input
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