Consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments

Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):203-214 (2000)
Abstract
Because metacognition consists in our having mental access to our cognitive states and mental states are conscious only when we are conscious of them in some suitable way, metacognition and consciousness shed important theoretical light on one another. Thus, our having metacognitive access to information carried by states that are not conscious helps con?rm the hypothesis that a mental state
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1006/ccog.2000.0437
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,370
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Two Concepts of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Consciousness is Not a Property of States: A Reply to Wilberg.Jacob Berger - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):829-842.
Reid on Consciousness: Hop, Hot or For?Rebecca Copenhaver - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):613-634.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
172 ( #27,588 of 2,193,783 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #59,949 of 2,193,783 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature