Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):194-204 (2019)

Authors
David Rosenthal
CUNY Graduate Center
Abstract
There is strong reason to doubt that the intuitions Chalmers' meta-problem focuses on are widespread or independent of proto-theoretical prompting. So it's unlikely that they result from factors connected to the nature of consciousness. In any case, it's only the accuracy of the problem intuitions that matters for evaluating theories of consciousness or revealing the nature of consciousness, not an explanation of how they arise. Unless we determine that they're accurate about consciousness, we mustn't assume that realism about consciousness incorporates them, or that denying them means denying that consciousness exists. And we must assess whether they're accurate independently of how they arise.
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