David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 138 (3):299 - 316 (2008)
There has been some recent optimism that addressing the question of how we distinguish sensory modalities will help us consider whether there are limits on a scientific understanding of perceptual states. For example, Block has suggested that the way we distinguish sensory modalities indicates that perceptual states have qualia which at least resist scientific characterization. At another extreme, Keeley argues that our common-sense way of distinguishing the senses in terms of qualitative properties is misguided, and offers a scientific eliminativism about common-sense modalities which avoids appeal to qualitative properties altogether. I’ll argue contrary to Keeley that qualitative properties are necessary for distinguishing senses, and contrary to Block that our common-sense distinction doesn’t indicate that perceptual states have qualia. A non-qualitative characterization of perceptual states isn’t needed to avoid the potential limit on scientific understanding imposed by qualia
|Keywords||Senses Modalities Qualia Perception|
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References found in this work BETA
H. P. Grice (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press.
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Mark Johnston (1992). How to Speak of the Colors. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
Citations of this work BETA
Richard Gray (2013). Is There a Space of Sensory Modalities? Erkenntnis 78 (6):1259-1273.
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