Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-Structuralism and Law

Blackwell (1984)

Abstract
This book fundamentally challenges the radical credentials of post-structuralism. Though Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze claim to have 'deconstructed' metaphysics, their work has much in common with previous attempts to 'end' the metaphysical tradition, from Kant to Nietzshe and Heidegger, and by sociology in general. Gillian Rose shows that this anti-metaphysical writing always appears in historically specific jurisprudential terms, which themselves found and recapitulate metaphysical categories. She reconsiders post-structuralism in this light and assesses the relationship between deconstruction and the earlier structuralism of Saussure and Levi-Strauss. She argues in conclusion that the choice between post-structuralist nihilism and Hegelian and Marxist dialectic is spurious
Keywords Law Philosophy  Natural law  Nihilism (Philosophy  Poststructuralism
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Call number K355.R67 1984
ISBN(s) 0631131914   9780631137085     0631137084
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The Secular Faith of Gillian Rose.Vincent Lloyd - 2008 - Journal of Religious Ethics 36 (4):683-705.
Giddens on Subjectivity and Social Order.Gerhard Wagner - 1993 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (2):139–155.

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