Dissertation, New York University (2019)

Authors
Chelsea Rosenthal
Simon Fraser University
Abstract
Our moral judgments are fallible, and we’re often uncertain what morality requires. I argue that, in the face of these challenges, it’s not only rational to use effective procedures for trying to be moral – we have a moral responsibility to do so, and being reckless when navigating moral uncertainty, is, itself, a form of moral wrongdoing. These strategic requirements present a large class of under-explored norms of morality. I use these norms to address moral and social questions concerning, for example, interpersonal toleration, exceptions to moral rules in high-stakes cases, and principal-agent relationships (such as those between lawyers and clients). (email for full text)
Keywords moral uncertainty  threshold deontology  toleration  principal-agent relationships  legal ethics  decision theory  procedural ought  substantive ought
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Non-Ideal Prescriptions for the Morally Uncertain.Amelia Hicks - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-26.

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