David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 25 (1):21 - 34 (2010)
Remarks such as âI am in painâ and âI think that itâs rainingâ are puzzling, since they seem to literally describe oneself as being in pain or having a particular thought, but their conditions of use tend to coincide with unequivocal expressions of pain or of that thought. This led Wittgenstein, among others, to treat such remarks as expressing, rather than as reporting, oneâs mental states. Though such expressivism is widely recognized as untenable, Bar-On has recently advanced a neo-expressivist view, on which such remarks exhibit characteristics of both expressions of mental states and reports of those states. I argue against any attempt to see such remarks as both reporting and expressing the same mental states, and that a correct account rests on distinguishing the truth conditions of such remarks from their conditions of use.
|Keywords||Expressivism Wittgenstein Sellars Moore’s paradox False belief|
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References found in this work BETA
Wilfrid Sellars (1963). Science, Perception, and Reality. New York: Humanities Press.
H. Wimmer (1983). Beliefs About Beliefs: Representation and Constraining Function of Wrong Beliefs in Young Children's Understanding of Deception. Cognition 13 (1):103-128.
Wilfrid Sellars (1968). Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes. New York: Humanities P..
George Edward Moore (1942). A Reply to My Critics. In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Open Court.
Citations of this work BETA
John N. Williams (2013). Moore's Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.
Javier Vidal López (2014). Expresión, descripción y creencia consciente. Ideas Y Valores 63 (154):85-106.
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Jose S. Pescador Hierro (1997). Problemas del empirismo en la filosofía de la mente. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):35-49.
Michael McKinsey (1979). Expressing Mental States. Philosophia 8 (4):657-671.
Jerome A. Shaffer (1961). Could Mental States Be Brain Processes? Journal of Philosophy 58 (December):813-22.
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