Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):101-105 (2020)

Authors
Benjamin Rossi
Duke University
Abstract
Kyle Fritz and Daniel Miller’s reply to my article helpfully clarifies their position and our main points of disagreement. Their view is that those who blame hypocritically lack the right to blame for a violation of some moral norm N in virtue of having an unfair disposition to blame others, but not themselves, for violations of N. This view raises two key questions. First, are there instances of hypocritical blame that do not involve an unfair differential blaming disposition? Second, if the answer to the first question is Yes, do hypocritical blamers of this kind lack the right to blame? In this paper, I argue that the answer to the first question is Yes. Given this, Fritz and Miller’s account faces serious problems regardless of whether the answer to the second question is Yes or No.
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-020-10063-6
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References found in this work BETA

The Commitment Account of Hypocrisy.Benjamin Rossi - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):553-567.
Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame.Kyle G. Fritz & Daniel Miller - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):118-139.

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