Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):106-117 (2006)

There is a strong formal analogy between proposition-wise supervenience of collective doxastic rationality on individual doxasticrationality and supervenience of social choice functions on individual choice functions. In light of this analogy, the basis for List and Pettit’s impossibility theorems can fruitfully be compared with the basis for Arrow’s. This helps to explain why List and Pettit can derive no impossibility theorem for set-wise supervenience. However, there are empirical reasons for doubting that set-wise supervenience of collective doxastic rationality on individual doxastic rationality is necessary; a systematic feedback relationship between the former and some individual behavioral dispositions is probably sufficient to dissolve mysteries about group agency. Group doxastic rationality need not supervene on individual rationality
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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Reprint years 2006
ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2006.tb00033.x
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Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.

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