How to be a Cognitivist about Practical Reason

Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:243-281 (2009)
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Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder (2014). Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Jonathan Way (2010). The Normativity of Rationality. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1057-1068.
Sam Shpall (2016). The Calendar Paradox. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):801-825.

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