Philosophical Issues 20 (1):368-393 (2010)
It’s often held that undetectable inversion of mental qualities is, if not possible, at least conceivable. It’s thought to be conceivable that the mental quality your visual states exhibit when you see something red in standard conditions is literally of the same type as the mental quality my visual states exhibit when I see something green in such circumstances. It’s thought, moreover, to be conceivable that such inversion of mental qualities could be wholly undetectable by any third-person means. And since first- person access is limited to a single individual, and so could not reveal a disparity in mental quality between us, third-person undetectability means undetectability tout court
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The Sensory Content of Perceptual Experience.Jacob Berger - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):446-468.
Olfactory Consciousness Across Disciplines.Andreas Keller & Benjamin D. Young - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory.Jake Quilty‐Dunn - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):550-575.
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