Ethics 106 (2):297-326 (1996)
Proponents of numerous recent theories of a person's good hold that a plausible account of the good for a person must satisfy existence internalism. Yet little direct defense has been given for this position. I argue that the principal intuition behind internalism supports a stronger version of the thesis than it might appear--one that effects a "double link" to motivation. I then identify and develop the main arguments that have been or might be given in support of internalism about a person's good, showing how these arguments support this stronger version of internalism.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Relational Good and the Multiplicity Problem.Connie S. Rosati - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):205-234.
Desire-Satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal.Dale Dorsey - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):151-171.
Intrinsic Value and the Supervenience Principle.Dale Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):267-285.
The Missing-Desires Objection to Hybrid Theories of Well-Being.William Lauinger - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):270-295.
Similar books and articles
On the Metaphysics of Internalism and Externalism.Alberto Voltolini - 2005 - Disputatio 18 (2):1 - 24.
Wittgenstein and the Internalism-Externalism Dilemma.Maciej Witek - 2003 - In W. Löffler & P. Weingartner (eds.), Knowledge and Belief. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Good Advice and Rational Action.Eric Wiland - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):561-569.
An Argument Against Motivational Internalism.Elinor Mason - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part2):135-156.
Deontology and Defeat.Michael Bergmann - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):87-102.
Internalism About a Person's Good: Don't Believe It.Alexander Sarch - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):161-184.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads94 ( #54,025 of 2,158,948 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #27,329 of 2,158,948 )
How can I increase my downloads?