Is equal moral consideration really compatible with unequal moral status?

Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 20 (3):251-276 (2010)
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Abstract

Most theorists writing about animal ethics acknowledge that many types of animals are conscious and have interests, meaning that these animals have "an experiential welfare" (Regan 2001, p. 202), and that because of this some things have, or might have, an "effect on [their] good, welfare, or well-being" (DeGrazia 1996, p. 39).1,2 Most also acknowledge that, as a result of many animals' possession of interests, they have moral status; that "animals' interests have moral importance independently of human interests" (DeGrazia 1996, p. 37).3 However, there is significant disagreement about how much animals' interests matter morally. Roughly, positions on this issue fall into one of two camps: equal moral ..

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Cognitive disability and moral status.David Wasserman - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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