Is knowing-how simply a case of knowing-that?

Philosophical Investigations 27 (4):370–379 (2004)

Authors
Tobias Rosefeldt
Humboldt-University, Berlin
Abstract
Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson have argued that there is no fundamental distinction between what Gilbert Ryle famously called 'knowing how' and 'knowing that', and that the former can be treated as a special kind of the latter. I will endeavour to show that sentences of the form 'a knows how to F' are ambiguous between a reading in which we ascribe knowledge-that to a and another in which we ascribe something to a which is irreducible to any kind of knowledge-that and can most appropriately be characterized as an ability. The authors' attempt to reduce also the latter reading to an ascription of knowledge-that fails because it rests on an unexplained conception of practical modes of presentation.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2004.00232.x
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References found in this work BETA

Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

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Citations of this work BETA

Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Know-How and Concept Possession.Bengson John & Moffett Marc - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.
On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit.Kim Frost - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (4):429-484.
Two Methodologies for Evaluating Intellectualism.Ephraim Glick - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):398-434.

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