Justice in epistemic gaps: The ‘proof paradox’ revisited

Philosophical Issues 31 (1):315-333 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper defends the heretical view that, at least in some cases, we ought to assign legal liability based on purely statistical evidence. The argument draws on prominent civil law litigation concerning pharmaceutical negligence and asbestos-poisoning. The overall aim is to illustrate moral pitfalls that result from supposing that it is never appropriate to rely on bare statistics when settling a legal dispute.

Similar books and articles

Legal proof and statistical conjunctions.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2021-2041.
Recent work on the proof paradox.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12667.
Rehabilitating Statistical Evidence.Lewis Ross - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):3-23.
The “She Said, He Said” Paradox and the Proof Paradox.Georgi Gardiner - forthcoming - In Zachary Hoskins and Jon Robson (ed.), Truth and Trial.
Against the Alleged Insufficiency of Statistical Evidence.Sam Fox Krauss - 2020 - Florida State University Law Review 47:801-825.
Against legal probabilism.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Jon Robson & Zachary Hoskins (eds.), The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials. Routledge.
The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof.Georgi Gardiner - 2019 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (3):288-318.
De Re Beliefs and Evidence in Legal Cases.Samuel J. Thomas - 2021 - Dissertation, Arizona State University
Legal stories and the process of proof.Floris Bex & Bart Verheij - 2013 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 21 (3):253-278.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-06-06

Downloads
278 (#43,605)

6 months
92 (#9,678)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Lewis Ross
London School of Economics

Citations of this work

The Foundations of Criminal Law Epistemology.Lewis Ross - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
Knowledge, individualised evidence and luck.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3791-3815.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
The Probable and the Provable.Laurence Jonathan Cohen - 1977 - Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press.

View all 28 references / Add more references