Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):19-50 (2013)

Authors
David Rose
Stanford University
Abstract
Knowledge is widely thought to entail belief. But Radford has claimed to offer a counterexample: the case of the unconfident examinee. And Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel have claimed empirical vindication of Radford. We argue, in defense of orthodoxy, that the unconfident examinee does indeed have belief, in the epistemically relevant sense of dispositional belief. We buttress this with empirical results showing that when the dispositional conception of belief is specifically elicited, people’s intuitions then conform with the view that knowledge entails (dispositional) belief
Keywords Knowledge  Belief  Experimental philosophy  Radford  Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0052-z
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.

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Citations of this work BETA

Competence to Know.Lisa Miracchi - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):29-56.

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