Logical Consequence for Nominalists

It is often claimed that nominalistic programmes to reconstruct mathematics fail, since they will at some point involve the notion of logical consequence which is unavailable to the nominalist. In this paper we use an idea of Goodman and Quine to develop a nominalistically acceptable explication of logical consequence
Keywords Philosophy of mathematics   nominalism   logical consequence   inferentialism   Nelson Goodman   W.V. Quine
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DOI theoria200924214
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