Metaethics, Agnosticism, and Logic

Dialectica 60 (1):47-61 (2006)

Sven Rosenkranz
Universitat de Barcelona
In this paper, I present an argument for the revision of classical logic. The argument is based on the coherence of a metaethical position which is a species of agnosticism. According to this view, the debate between cognitivists and noncognitivists about moral discourse is unresolved. I argue that there is something at stake in this debate and so something one can coherently be agnostic about. The revisionary argument also draws on principles of epistemic closure. I make these principles explicit and indicate to what extent they can plausibly be assumed. The proposal to revise classical logic is likely to meet with some resistance: classical logic is too deeply entrenched in our reasoning. Before suggesting what to put in its place, I address and defuse four objections that might be levelled against the argument for its revision. I close with some general remarks on the force of arguments for logical reform.
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DOI 10.1111/dltc.2006.60.issue-1
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References found in this work BETA

Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Mind, Value and Reality.John Mcdowell - 1998 - Mind 109 (435):533-557.
The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam & James Conant - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (177):519-527.

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Emotions, Me, Myself and I.Fabrice Teroni - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):433-451.

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