Dialectica 60 (1):47–61 (2006)
In this paper, I present an argument for the revision of classical logic. The argument is based on the coherence of a metaethical position which is a species of agnosticism. According to this view, the debate between cognitivists and noncognitivists about moral discourse is unresolved. I argue that there is something at stake in this debate and so something one can coherently be agnostic about. The revisionary argument also draws on principles of epistemic closure. I make these principles explicit and indicate to what extent they can plausibly be assumed. The proposal to revise classical logic is likely to meet with some resistance: classical logic is too deeply entrenched in our reasoning. Before suggesting what to put in its place, I address and defuse four objections that might be levelled against the argument for its revision. I close with some general remarks on the force of arguments for logical reform
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Agnosticism About Other Worlds: A New Antirealist Programme in Modality.John Divers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):660–685.
Dr. Abbot's "Way Out of Agnosticism":The "Way Out of Agnosticism; or, the Philosophy of Free Religion,". Francis Ellingwood Abbot.Josiah Royce - 1890 - Ethics 1 (1):98-.
How a Kantian Can Accept Evolutionary Metaethics.Frederick Rauscher - 1997 - Biology and Philosophy 12 (3):303-326.
Weak Agnosticism Defended.Graham Oppy - 1994 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 36 (3):147 - 167.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads37 ( #137,410 of 2,158,201 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #356,322 of 2,158,201 )
How can I increase my downloads?