Metacognition and higher-order thoughts

Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):231-242 (2000)
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Abstract

Because there is a fair amount of overlap in the points by Balog and Rey, I will organize this response topically, referring specifically to each commentator as rele- vant. And, because much of the discussion focuses on my higher-order-thought hypothesis independent of questions about metacognition, I will begin by addressing a cluster of issues that have to do with the status, motivation, and exact formulation of that hypothesis.

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David Rosenthal
CUNY Graduate Center

Citations of this work

Exaggerated reports: reply to Block.David Rosenthal - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):431-437.
Introspection and subliminal perception.Thomas Zoega Ramsøy & Morten Overgaard - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):1-23.
Consciousness is not a property of states: A reply to Wilberg.Jacob Berger - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):829-842.
The biological function of consciousness.Brian Earl - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.

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References found in this work

On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Two concepts of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.
Individualism and self-knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.

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