Meta-ethics and justification

Acta Analytica 23 (2):91-114 (2008)
The author takes up three metaphysical conceptions of morality — realism, projectivism, constructivism — and the account of justification or reason that makes these pictures possible. It is argued that the right meta-ethical conception should be the one that entails the most plausible conception of reason-giving, rather than by any other consideration. Realism and projectivism, when understood in ways consistent with their fundamental commitments, generate unsatisfactory models of justification; constructivism alone does not. The author also argues for a particular interpretation of how “objective moral obligation” is to be understood within constructivism.
Keywords Meta-ethics  Justification  Realism  Projectivism  Constructivism
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-008-0023-3
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Singer (1993). Practical Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Peter Railton (1986). Moral Realism. Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.

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