Nothing at Stake in Knowledge

Noûs 53 (1):224-247 (2019)

Authors
Daniel Cohnitz
Utrecht University
Hyundeuk Cheon
Seoul National University
Giorgio Volpe
Università degli Studi di Bologna
5 more
Abstract
In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism.
Keywords stakes  knowledge  cross-cultural
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Reprint years 2017, 2019
DOI 10.1111/nous.12211
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):180-187.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.
Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons.Stewart Cohen - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:57-89.
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.

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Citations of this work BETA

Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Robust Across Demographic Differences.Joshua Knobe - 2019 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 56 (2):29-36.

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