Cognitive Science 41 (2):482-502 (2017)

Authors
Wesley Buckwalter
George Mason University
David Rose
Stanford University
Abstract
How might advanced neuroscience—in which perfect neuro-predictions are possible—interact with ordinary judgments of free will? We propose that peoples' intuitive ideas about indeterminist free will are both imported into and intrude into their representation of neuroscientific scenarios and present six experiments demonstrating intrusion and importing effects in the context of scenarios depicting perfect neuro-prediction. In light of our findings, we suggest that the intuitive commitment to indeterminist free will may be resilient in the face of scientific evidence against such free will.
Keywords Importing  Neuroscience  Intrusion effect  Cultural transmission  Compatibilism  Free will
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DOI 10.1111/cogs.12310
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Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition.John Turri - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S3):403-424.

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