On An Attempt to Undermine Reason-Responsive Compatibilism by Appealing to Moral Luck: Reply to Gerald K. Harrison

Sorites 19:7-13 (2007)

Abstract

This is a reply to G.K. Harrison's article «Hyper Libertarianism and Moral Luck». There he argues for the advantage of hyper-libertarianism upon reason-responsive compatibilism in virtue of its integration of moral luck in a principled way. I shall try to show that his argument is unsound. Crucial to my reply will be that Harrison's idea of moral luck is an unjustifiedly narrow one. Although the aim of establishing an appropriate connection between the issues of moral luck and free will is worth pursuing, I shall argue that moral luck cannot solve the free will dispute in the way Harrison intends

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,660

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
52 (#221,848)

6 months
1 (#388,784)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Similar books and articles

Moral Luck and the Professions.Jeffrey Whitman - 2008 - Business and Professional Ethics Journal 27 (1-4):35-54.
How (Not) to Attack the Luck Argument.E. J. Coffman - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):157-166.
Hurley on Justice and Responsibility. [REVIEW]Peter Vallentyne - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):433 - 438.
Moral Luck and the Law.David Enoch - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (1):42-54.
Moral and Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):1–25.

Author's Profile

Sergi Rosell
University of Valencia

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations