On An Attempt to Undermine Reason-Responsive Compatibilism by Appealing to Moral Luck: Reply to Gerald K. Harrison
Sorites 19:7-13 (2007)
AbstractThis is a reply to G.K. Harrison's article «Hyper Libertarianism and Moral Luck». There he argues for the advantage of hyper-libertarianism upon reason-responsive compatibilism in virtue of its integration of moral luck in a principled way. I shall try to show that his argument is unsound. Crucial to my reply will be that Harrison's idea of moral luck is an unjustifiedly narrow one. Although the aim of establishing an appropriate connection between the issues of moral luck and free will is worth pursuing, I shall argue that moral luck cannot solve the free will dispute in the way Harrison intends
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