Personal and impersonal obligation

How are claims about what people ought to do related to claims about what ought to be the case? That is, how are claims about of personal obligation, of the form s ought to ?, related to claims about impersonal obligation, of the form it ought to be the case that p? Many philosophers have held that the former type of claim can be reduced to the latter. In particular, they have held a view known as the Meinong-Chisholm Thesis, which, on its simplest formulation, can be stated thus: MCT: s ought to ? if and only if it ought to be the case that s ?s.[i] This thesis, I will argue, is false, and the reason for its falsity is a general problem facing any related attempt to reduce personal to impersonal obligation.
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