Preferences and paternalism on freedom and deliberative democracy

Political Theory 33 (3):370 - 396 (2005)
This article discusses the relationship between the ideal of autonomous preference formation and the danger of paternalism in deliberative democratic theory. It argues that the aim of autonomous preference formation can and should be decoupled from a justification of paternalistic state action aimed at reshaping citizens 'preferences. The problem of nonautonomous preference formation is rooted in the communication structure in which each and every one forms her preferences and hence cannot be solved by some paternalistically judging on others'behalf The argument is based on a new formulation of the deliberative democratic ideal, which emphasizes and clarifies the multiple dimensions of freedom it incorporates
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DOI 10.1177/0090591704272351
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Freedom of Expression, Deliberation, Autonomy and Respect.Christian F. Rostbøll - 2011 - European Journal of Political Theory 10 (1):5-21.

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