Authors
Peter Ross
California State Polytechnic University, Pomona
Abstract
I argue that phenomenal externalism is preferable to phenomenal internalism on the basis of externalism's explanatory power with respect to qualitative character. I argue that external qualities, namely, external physical properties that are qualitative independent of consciousness, are necessary to explain qualitative character, and that phenomenal externalism is best understood as accepting external qualities while phenomenal internalism is best understood as rejecting them. I build support for the claim that external qualities are necessary to explain qualitative character on the basis of a model of color perception as a certain sort of information filter by which perceivers gain access to external qualities.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12375
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.
Phenomenal Character.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):21-38.
Thinking That One Thinks.David M. Rosenthal - 1993 - In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell.

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Phenomenal Character, Phenomenal Concepts, and Externalism.Jonathan Ellis - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):273 - 299.
Stained Glass as a Model for Consciousness.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):90-103.
An Argument for Shape Internalism.Jan Almäng - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):819-836.
The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal Experience.Neil Mehta - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (6):311-331.
The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification.Declan Smithies - 2014 - In Jesper Kallestrup & Mark Sprevak (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 98-124.
Phenomenal Concepts.Andreas Elpidorou - 2015 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
The Spread Mind. Is Consciousness Situated?".Riccardo Manzotti - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):55-78.
On the Deferential Use of Phenomenal Concepts.Julia Telles de Menezes - 2016 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72 (2-3):573-596.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-01-13

Total views
288 ( #36,322 of 2,498,794 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
40 ( #21,550 of 2,498,794 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes