Ratio 21 (2):218–230 (2008)

Adina Roskies
Dartmouth College
The problem of induction is perennially important in epistemology and the philosophy of science. In response to Goodman's 'New Riddle of Induction', Frank Jackson made a compelling case for there being no new riddle, by arguing that there are no nonprojectible properties. Although Jackson's denial of nonprojectible properties is correct, I argue here that he is mistaken in thinking that he thereby shows that there is no new riddle of induction, and demonstrate that his solution to the grue paradox fails to rule out the possibility of equally justified contradictory inductions. More importantly, in illuminating where Jackson's argument fails, the paper casts a new light on the problem of induction, locating the problem not in the nature of the next (unexamined) x, but in the counterfactual robustness of properties of already examined x's.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2008.00396.x
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Bet Accepted: A Reply to Freitag.Christopher Dorst - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):175-183.

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