Rethinking nature: A hard problem within the hard problem

Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):76-88 (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

If experience cannot be explained reductively, then we must embrace a revised understanding of nature to explain it. What kind of revision is required? A minimal revision would merely append a theory of experience onto an otherwise adequate theory of cognition, without going far beyond considerations peculiar to the study of the mind. I argue that we will need a more expansive revision, requiring us to rethink the natural order quite generally. If this is right, we will view the mind as a special context in which something new to our understanding of the world, and much more general, is being manifested

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,140

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
59 (#202,604)

6 months
1 (#448,551)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Gregg Rosenberg
Indiana University

Citations of this work

Panexperientialism, cognition, and the nature of experience.Amy Kind - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references