Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):76-88 (1996)
AbstractIf experience cannot be explained reductively, then we must embrace a revised understanding of nature to explain it. What kind of revision is required? A minimal revision would merely append a theory of experience onto an otherwise adequate theory of cognition, without going far beyond considerations peculiar to the study of the mind. I argue that we will need a more expansive revision, requiring us to rethink the natural order quite generally. If this is right, we will view the mind as a special context in which something new to our understanding of the world, and much more general, is being manifested
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Panexperientialism, cognition, and the nature of experience.Amy Kind - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
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