¿Retórica O Verdad? La “tercera Vía” De Platón

Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 29 (2):285-316 (2003)
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Abstract

This paper deals with Plato’s theoretical views on rhetoric, its value, its conditions, and its genuine ethical-political function. My goal is to show that, even from the theoretical and/or metarhetorical point of view (Gorgias and Phaedrus), Plato would admit the practice of arguing from probabilities (eikós) and opinions, and would accept as a legitimate part of rhetoric –in order to persuade the mob– devices such as appeals to emotion. As it is well known, concrete uses of these devices can be found in the dialogues. I will refer, in this vein, to some passages of Plato’s political writings, esp. Republic and Laws, and to the role of some myths in the dialogues. Nonetheless, I sustain the necessity (and the possibility) of harmonizing this view, with Plato’s strong claim that knowledge of (and commitment to) an objective truth is essential to the true rhétor.

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Gabriela Rossi
Universidad de Los Andes, Chile

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