Ratio 22 (1):126-135 (2009)

Authors
Jake Ross
Illinois State University
Abstract
Parfit argues that a form of rule consequentialism can be derived from the most plausible formulation of the fundamental principle of Kantian ethics. And so he concludes that Kantians should be consequentialists. I argue that we have good reason to reject two of the auxiliary premises that figure in Parfit's derivation of rule consequentialism from Kantianism. 1.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2008.00421.x
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Parfit, Convergence, and Underdetermination.Marius Baumann - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (3).
Kant-Bibliographie 2009.Margit Ruffing - 2011 - Kant-Studien 102 (4):499-540.

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