Sensibility theory and conservative complancency

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):544–555 (2005)
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Abstract

In Ruling Passions, Simon Blackburn contends that we should reject sensibility theory because it serves to support a conservative complacency. Blackburn's strategy is attractive in that it seeks to win this metaethical dispute – which ultimately stems from a deep disagreement over antireductionism – on the basis of an uncontroversial normative consideration. Therefore, Blackburn seems to offer an easy solution to an apparently intractable debate. We will show, however, that Blackburn's argument against sensibility theory does not succeed; it is no more supportive of conservative complacency than Blackburn's noncognitivism. A victory for noncognitivism cannot be so easily won.

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Author Profiles

Peter Ross
California State Polytechnic University, Pomona
Dale Turner
University of California, Riverside
Dale Turner
California State Polytechnic University, Pomona

Citations of this work

Virtue and Disagreement.Bridget Clarke - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (3):273-291.

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References found in this work

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Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Principia ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications. Edited by Thomas Baldwin.

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